Structural Reform on the Ballot
Analysis of November 2024 Prop D
I think we are unlikely to achieve good government if the majority of voters have no ability to reason about ballot measures they’re voting on. But it’s also pretty hard to make sense of these things. Learning the fundamentals of government is an important step, but so is finding reliable sources of information. This analysis of November 2024 Prop D is intended to be just such a source. I will describe precisely what the law says, and if I’m ever offering my interpretation, I’ll note that explicitly.
Proposition D on the November 2024 ballot is one of the most consequential measures I’ve seen during my time in SF. It proposes to expand the Mayor’s authority, reduce the number of commissions by half, and streamline the relationships between elected officials, commissions, and departments. Although there is widespread agreement across the political spectrum that commission reform is needed, this initiative is the most ambitious effort to date.
It’s worth taking the time to understand. Here’s the official summary from the voter information pamphlet:
This is a good summary but without background information and additional context, no summary is good enough to solidly base a decision on. That’s what we’re here for. We’ll set some context and then break down those bullet points one by one.
Table of Contents
What is a Commission?
Prop D Analysis
2a. Limiting the Number of Commissions
2b. Removing and Restructuring Commissions
2c. Changing Commission Authority
2d. Simplifying Commissioner Appointment/Removal Process
2e. Reducing Police Commission Authority
2f. Eliminating Commissioner Compensation
2g. Simplifying Department Head Appointment/Removal Process
Political Context
Conclusion
1. What is a Commission?
First we need to clarify what we’re talking about. The Mayor and departments are relatively straightforward - elected officials like the Mayor have the most authority and set the overall direction. Departments like Public Works or Police are boots-on-the-ground picking up trash and responding to 911 calls.
“Commission” is a bit tricky because we use the term loosely. In fact, a recent report by the Civil Grand Jury found that we use 25 different names to describe them.1 Regardless of what we call them, they are small groups2 of citizens (not government employees) usually appointed by elected officials like the Mayor and Board of Supervisors. We can bucket them into two categories: decision-making and not-decision-making.
The voter information pamphlet calls them all “commissions”, but in the SF Government Graph, I only call decision-making entities Commissions, and the non-decision-making entities Advisory. I’ll use “commission” generally like Prop D does, and when I need to be specific I’ll use italics Commission or Advisory.
With this in mind, we can think of the SF government as a three-layer stack:
Commissions are like middle management over the departments. The Police Commission sets policies3 for the Police Department, disciplines police officers, and can remove the Chief of Police. Advisory entities like the Behavioral Health Commission issue reports and recommendations but can’t set departmental policy or fire anyone.
As we’ll see below, some commissions are defined in the Charter, which means the voters must approve any changes. The rest are defined in other parts of the Municipal Code, which means that the Board of Supervisors can change them through the normal legislative process.
With these things in mind, let’s take a closer look at the ballot measure digest:
2. Prop D Analysis
2a. Limiting the Number of Commissions
The way it is now:
There is no limit on how many commissions the City may have.
The City currently has about 130 appointed boards, commissions and advisory bodies
The proposal:
Limit the City to a total of 65 commissions.4
Civ Lab Analysis:
Prop D would cut the number of commissions roughly in half. According to the SF Government Graph, 53 are Commissions and 75 are Advisory. For reference, we have about 50 departments.
While it’s hard to say what the “correct” number of commissions is, San Francisco is an outlier. The Civil Grand Jury report found that SF has a disproportionately high number of commissions compared to peer cities and counties, particularly on a per capita basis:
The 65 commission limit is activated 16 months after Prop D becomes effective, and section 2b describes the process for getting under that limit.
2b. Removing and Restructuring Commissions
The way it is now:
Of the 130 commissions, 44 are established in the Charter and can be changed only by the voters. The rest of the commissions are created by ordinance and typically may be amended or deleted by act of the Board of Supervisors.
The proposal:
Retain 20 Charter commissions5 and remove 24 Charter commissions6
Establish a five-member task force that would recommend within nine months which commissions should be reauthorized or restructured or dissolved to stay within the 65-commission limit. This task force would be appointed by the Mayor, the President of the Board, the Controller, the City Administrator and the City Attorney.7
The Board could by ordinance reauthorize or restructure those commissions within the 16-month period after the measure’s effective date to prevent them from being dissolved. The Board could later reestablish and create new commissions, subject to the 65-commission limit8
Civ Lab Analysis:
This sounds complex but it’s basically a three step process:
Move all but 20 commissions out of the Charter
Convene a Commission Streamlining Task Force to decide what to do with the remaining 45 spots (of the 65 total)
The Board of Supervisors implements the plan by passing a law, which they have the power to do for all entities outside the charter.
So we have a limit of 65 commissions and we know how we’ll reach it; now let’s look at what kind of authority those remaining commissions will have.
2c. Changing Commission Authority
The way it is now:
Many commissions have decision-making authority. Others are merely advisory. Some decide appeals and other administrative proceedings.
Some commissions oversee and set policy for City departments.
The proposal:
Require that any commissions the Board reauthorizes, restructures or creates could only advise the Board and Mayor, and have no decision-making authority except as mandated by state or federal law. Decision-making authority would transfer from commissioners to department heads. Authority to decide appeals and other proceedings would transfer to hearing officers.9
Civ Lab Analysis:
In section 1 we discussed various commission powers, and in section 2b we see that 20 commissions will remain in the Charter and all others will move to other parts of the Municipal Code or be repealed.
This is where our framework (Commission vs Advisory) is quite handy. The 45 entities outside the charter will not have decision-making powers, they will be Advisory. The 20 entities that remain in the charter will have decision-making powers, they are Commissions.
For entities that used to have decision-making power (Commissions) but will become not-decision-making (Advisory), those previous powers will be distributed back down to departments.
2d. Simplifying Commissioner Appointment/Removal Process
The way it is now:
For many commissions, the Mayor appoints at least a majority of its members and the Board appoints the rest. The Mayor’s appointments are generally subject to Board confirmation or rejection.
The Mayor and Board may remove members from some commissions only for official misconduct.
The proposal:
Allow the Mayor to appoint, without Board review, at least two-thirds of the members of reauthorized, restructured or new commissions, and some retained commissions. The Board would have authority to appoint up to one-third of the members of those commissions. The Board and Mayor could each remove the members they appoint for any lawful reason.10
Civ Lab Analysis:
There’s a couple mechanical items here that have a huge impact on the way city politics works:
The Mayor appoints the majority of commissioners, but Mayoral appointments are subject to Board of Supervisors approval
Commissioners are appointed to four year terms and can often only be removed for breaking the law
The argument for this is that it checks the power of the Mayor and insulates commissioners from political pressures. The argument against this is that it dilutes authority and leads to conflicting directions for departments.
A good way to understand the implications of Prop D is to look at the Police Commission:
The Mayor appoints four of the seven commissioners, while the Board appoints the other three. But the Board also gets to approve the Mayoral appointments, which means the Mayor can only choose a candidate the Board will approve.
Given that the Mayor and Commissions share oversight authority of departments, when they are politically misaligned, departments face conflicting direction. We would expect Prop D to cause most commissions to be politically aligned with the Mayor.
2e. Reducing Police Commission Authority
The way it is now:
The Police Commission adopts rules governing police officers’ conduct.
The proposal:
Give the Police Chief sole authority to adopt rules governing police officers’ conduct. The Police Commission would retain authority to discipline police officers and retain oversight over the Department of Police Accountability11
Civ Lab Analysis:
The relationship between the Police Commission and the Police Department has been a political hotspot in recent years as the city has grappled with police reform and public safety issues. Though the Police Commission will retain investigation and discipline powers, moving authority over police officer policy back down into the department resolves this dispute solidly on the side of the Mayor and Police Department. More on the political context in section 3.
2f. Eliminating Commissioner Compensation
The way it is now:
The City pays members of some commissions.
The City provides members of some commissions with health care benefits.
The proposal:
Prohibit the City from paying commissioners or providing them with health care benefits.12
Civ Lab Analysis:
This is pretty straightforward and less important than the other changes. As the Civil Grand Jury report notes: “As volunteers, members of decision-making bodies generally receive small stipends for attending meetings, and some commissioners are also entitled to San Francisco health insurance benefits, although very few take advantage of it. In the context of the San Francisco budget, these costs are insignificant.”
2g. Simplifying Department Head Appointment/Removal Process
The way it is now:
Some commissions oversee and set policy for City departments. These commissions generally nominate candidates to serve as department head. The Mayor has authority to appoint the department head solely from the candidates the commission nominates. Generally, only the commission has authority to remove the department head.
The proposal:
Give the Mayor sole authority to appoint and remove most City department heads.13
Civ Lab Analysis:
So far we have been considering changes to the oversight entities, but departments are affected as well. Across our 50+ city departments, a recent SPUR report documented that we currently have eight different pathways for appointing department heads:
As it stands, the Mayor only has outright authority to appoint four department heads, and in all other cases, requires Board/Commission approval or has no say at all. Standardizing department head appointing/removal power under the Mayor eliminates the conflicting directions discussed in section 2d and increases the power of the Mayor.
3. Political Context
Prop D is backed by Together SF Action, a prominent political group in the “moderate” democrat coalition. It is supported by most of the moderate coalition, including the official Democratic Party. A notable exception is current Mayor London Breed, although I believe she removed support for the measure because of political dynamics in the Mayoral race. The “progressive” democratic coalition is backing a competing ballot measure - Prop E. More on that to come.
4. Conclusion
I hope this information helps you reason about your decision concretely. There are few things I love more than discussing the structure of government, so hit me up and tell me what you think about Prop D!
Advisory Board, Coordinating Council, Advisory Committee, Council, Advisory Council, District, Advisory Group, Executive Committee, Authority, Group, Authority Board, Oversight and Advisory Committee, Board, Oversight Board, Board of Directors, Oversight Committee, Board of Trustees, Partnership, Commission, Public Authority, Committee, Task Force, Coordinating Board, Working Group, Coordinating Committee :)
Usually 5 or 7, but sometimes more
Things like use of force, traffic stop criteria, documentation requirements, etc.
Prop D Section 4, amending Charter Sec. 4.100, subsection (b)(1)
The 20 retained charter commissions:
Planning Commission (Prop D Section 9)
Board of Appeals (Prop D Section 10)
Fire Commission (Prop D Section 12)
Police Commission (Prop D Section 13)
Public Utilities Commission (Prop D Section 16)
Recreation and Park Commission (Prop D Section 17)
Airport Commission (Prop D Section 18)
Disability and Aging Services Commission (Prop D Section 22)
War Memorial Board of Trustees (Prop D Section 37)
Municipal Transportation Agency Board of Directors (Prop D Section 41)
Port Commission (Prop D does not change Charter Sec. 4.114)
Ethics Commission (Prop D does not change Charter Sec. 15.100)
Elections Commission (Prop D does not change Charter Sec. 13.103.5)
Health Service Board (Prop D does not change Charter Sec. 12.200)
Civil Service Commission (Prop D does not change Charter Sec. 10.100)
Retirement Board (Prop D does not change Charter Sec. 12.100)
Retiree Health Care Trust Fund Board (Prop D does not change Charter Sec. 12.204)
Asian Arts Commission (Prop D does not change Charter Sec. 5.104)
Fine Arts Museums Board of Trustees (Prop D does not change Charter Sec. 5.105)
Redistricting Task Force (Prop D does not change Charter Sec. 13.110)
The 24 (actually 25) removed charter commissions:
Human Rights Commission (Section 11)
Health Commission (Section 14)
Human Services Commission (Section 15)
Entertainment Commission (Section 19)
Commission on Environment (Section 20)
Commission on Status of Women (Section 21)
Building Inspection Commission (Section 23)
Youth Commission (Section 24)
Homeless Oversight Commission (Section 28)
Small Business Commission (Section 29)
Historic Preservation Commission (Section 30)
Sheriff’s Department Oversight Board (Section 31)
Sanitation and Streets Commission (Section 32)
Public Works Commission (Section 34)
Arts Commission (Section 36)
Juvenile Probation Commission (Section 38)
Library Commission (Section 39)
Municipal Transportation Agency Citizens’ Advisory Committee (Section 40)
Public Utilities Citizens’ Advisory Committee (Section 44)
Rate Fairness Board (Section 46)
Parks, Recreation, and Open Space Advisory Committee (Section 50)
Children, Youth, and Their Families Oversight and Advisory Committee (Section 51)
Office of Early Care and Education Citizens’ Advisory Committee (Section 52)
Our Children, Our Families Council (Section 53)
Dignity Fund Oversight and Advisory Committee (Section 60)
Note: I believe the ballot measure digests omits the Office of Early Care and Education Citizens’ Advisory Committee because it is already inactive.
Prop D Section 4, amending Charter Sec. 4.100, subsection (d)(1)-(2)
Prop D Section 4, amending Charter Sec. 4.100, subsection (e)(1)-(2)
Prop D Section 4, amending Charter Sec. 4.100, subsection (j)
Prop D Section 4, amending Charter Sec. 4.100, subsection (i)
Prop D Section 13, amending Charter Sec. 4.109
Prop D Section 47, amending Charter Sec. 12.202
Prop D Section 62, amending Charter Sec. A8.400
Prop D Section 3, amending Charter Sec. 3.100, subsection 19